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Preface
The growing inertia of the energy sector and the market
penetration phenomenon make long-term (25 to 50 years) energy
forecasting increasingly mandatory. One of the greatest un-
certainties is related to the energy demand, i.e. the product
of world population (for which some long-term forecasts differ
by plus or minus 50%) and of possible energy consumption per
capita (for which other forecasts vary by as much as 500% or
even more). As an illustration, this paper compares a basic
(A. Weinberg, 1971) scenario, and regionalized scenarios. The
broad range of figures obtained--from 38 to 300 . 109 kW(th)-
-puts in proper perspective the importance of the transition
period and of the optimum choice among the various long-term
energy alternatives.
Methods for comparing options--or preparing choices--are
insufficiently developed: cost/benefit analysis (the most
broadly utilized), impact matrix, preference functions. An
impact matrix, WELMM (for Water, Energy, Land, Materials and
Manpower) is being developed in the Energy Program at IIASA
and is presented briefly in this paper. Preliminary results
of comparing land and materials requirements for three different
1000 MW(e) reference power plants (coal, nuclear and solar)
illustrate the interest of a better understanding of the systems
aspects of harvesting and using energy resources on a very broad
scale. Moreover, this kind of approach can be extended to other
economic sectors outside energy and appears to be a useful tool
for natural resource management and long term forecasting.
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Abstract
Because-of the long lead times in the energy sector and
long market penetration periods, decision making must be
prepared early. But uncertainties, and especially the uncertainty
of future energy demand, make it a difficult task. Among
possible methods of comparing energy options, the WELMM approach
has been developed, and is introduced.
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Long Term Energy Strategies
The growing inertia of the energy sector and the considerable
size of financial commitments make long-term energy forecasting
increasingly mandatory, both on a national or regional basis as
well as on a global basis. Improper or untimely decisions will
corne to bear more and more heavily upon the community as a whole.
Yet forecasts are difficult to make because of three major
uncertainties: The possible absolute level of the world
population, absolute and relative levels of energy consumption
per capita, and the structure of energy demand (energy mix and
possible role of secondary energies) .
NECESSARY TIME SCALE FOR FORECASTING
The first point is to get an idea of what can be considered
a necessary time scale fore forecasting: 10 years, 50 years,
100 years? Depending on the people concerned--industrial,
governmental, or scientific--there are variations in the acceptance
of the expressions of short, medium and long term. Generally,
in the Energy Program at IIASA, we consider the three periods
from now to 1985, from 1985 to 2020-2025, and beyond 2025. Of
greatest interest to us is the second period, from 1985 to 2025,
which does not, however, mean that decisions do not have to be
taken before this time. Indeed, they must be taken now or in
the corning years.
Three examples will serve to illustrate why we consider 50
years to be a necessary time-scale unit for forecasting.
If we consider a single-unit commercial pressurized water
reactor like those being built today, the time scale extends
over some 50 years: 10 to 12 years from preliminary planning to
start-up, 30 years of operating life (with long term requirements
of natural uranium and enrichement supply) and possibly 10 to 12
years more for decommissioning and/or possible dismantling.
If we look today at nuclear developments as a whole, about
35 years after the first demonstration of a chain reaction, and
after having benefitted in fact from the impulse of generously
funded military programs and from exceptionally favorable
development conditions (which we did not even appreciate at the
time!), nuclear fission now accounts for about one to two per
cent of the world's total energy production and consumption.
However, it is still relatively far away from a completely
succesful achievement as long as the fuel cycle is not fully
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and commercially implemented. This is clearly illustrated by
Figure 1, which shows the timing of the development of the
fission breeder over a time-span of at least 50 years, possibly
more. The same would probably apply to high temperature gas-
cooled reactors; the temporary commercial success of the General
Atomic line of high temperature gas cooled reactor raised some
hopes about a possibly faster path, but it now seems that we are
back to an inevitable path of development aiming at a minimum
50-year developmental period.
1944
- 1948
- 1955
_ 1959
_ 1965
The principle of breeding, Fermi
Clementine, Los Alamos
EBR1; BR1, BR2
The oxide breeder, LMFBR
1000 MW(e) design studies
- 1965-1975 Fuel and materials testing
- 1972-1980 300 MW(e) prototypes, Phenix etc.
- 1970-1980 Testing, proofing, licensing
- 1980-1990 First 1000 MW(e) stations
> 1990 Commercial operation, fuel cycle
Figure 1. Timing of the fission breeder
development.
How far, in fact, is this inevitable? Or, put another way,
what is the possible share of "fate" in long-term energy
strategies? This is very interesting to consider in connection
with C. Marchetti's various market penetration curves for
different energies [1]. In a broad general study, Marchetti has
analyzed over periods longer than 100 years the market penetration
of various non-energetic commodities and the mechanism of sub-
stituting an old good by a new one. Examples of this would be
a different process for steel production, the substitution of
butter by margarine, synthetic fibres, paints, etc. The appli-
cation of this method to various fuels is shown in Figure 2 in
the U.S. economy for wood, coal, oil, and natural gas; the time
necessary to gain a 50% share of the market (or to lose it, as
in the case of wood and partially in that of coal) varies between
52 and 135 years.
•
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Figure 2. Fitting of the statistical data on primary energy
consumption in the u.s.
This has been applied by c. Marchetti [1] and W. Hafele [2]
to scenario analysis in demonstrating the possible growth
of nuclear energy and its progressive displacement by some
hypothetical future energy "solfus" (from solar and fusion) as
shown in Figure 3.
In any event, what is important to realize is that mankind
has this 50 to 60 year lead-time for a massive introduction of a
new fuel technology. This can, however, be used both ways as far
as decision-making is concerned. First, for planning the intro-
duction of a new fuel technology such as the breeder or the very
high temperature reactor Ｈ ｖ ｈ ｾ Ｇ ｒ Ｉ Ｌ 50 years at least will be needed,
assuming that all the necessary steps and sectors are developed
in time. We know today that more time may be needed if parallel
or following sectors are relatively underdeveloped: This is the
case in the reprocessing of irradiated fuels, the difficulties
of which have been somewhat underestimated; it is hard to say
now what negative influence this underestimation may possibly
have on the overall penetration of nuclear energy.
However, from a general point of view, this penetration
period will be initiated when ti.2 decision is taken to go ahead.
This lead-time, which was not always understood nor accepted,
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Figure 3. u.s. energy consumption from various sources.
can, however, also be used the other way, when an objective is
fixed in time. For instance, in order to cover a certain
percentage of total energy consumption through a new fuel
technology at a given time, the time for reasonable decision-
making can be inferred from such a ｬ･｡､ｾｴｩｭ･Ｎ To illustrate
this another way, it is worth considering the CO 2 problem as
an example.
At IIASA we are analyzing the possibility of implementing
coal production and use on a very broad basis, taking into account
the very large amount of world coal resources--which may be still
more considerable than presently estimated--and exploring, for
instance, a two-fuel long-term strategy based on coal and nuclear
fuels in comparison with other mono-fuel (all nuclear) or multi-
fuel (coal, solar, nuclear, etc.) strategies. Assuming a ten-
fold increase, or more, of coal consumption, it appears that one
of the limiting factors could be the C02 problem, as studied by
W.o. Nordhaus [3]. Possible C02 reservoirs are shown, together
with their mutual rates of exchanges, in Figure 4. Depending on
the acceptable increase of C02 concentartion above existing levels
in conjunction with the risks of dramatic climatic effects, it
can be seen from Figure 5 that a large-sclae action to remove CO2
j
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from the atmosphere--or to prevent its dispersion after
combustion--must intervene between 2020 and 2050. C. Marchetti
has suggested dumping C02 directly into the deep layer of the
oceans. Other solutions can also be studied, but the main idea
is the following: if it is really decided that coal use be
implemented on a large world scale, it will also be urgently
necessary to study this C02 problem in more depth because it
could take a penetration lead-time of 50 to 60 years before
one is able to implement the technological solution on the
same large scale.
Incidentally, this would also show that the' fuel cycle
associated with carbon can be of major importance, similarly
in some aspects to the nuclear fuel cycle.
STRATOSPHERE
1970: 2.8
ｾ
2020: 29
4.411 4.5
TROPOSPHERE
461 ｾ 46.3
ｾ ｂ ｉ ｏ ﾭ
ｾ Ｍ ｓ ｐ ｾ ｒ ｅ
MIXED LAYER
OCEANS
21 5.4
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OCEANS
3300
MARINE
810-
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Figure 4. CO2
C flow
(Data:
'irs and CO2 flow - C contents in 10
9 t,
ra. in 10 9 t per year (1970 values)
Ret. [4]).
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Figure 5. Necessary control of fossil energy consumption,
if supplied in the form of coal, to stay below
certain CO2 levels in the troposphere(After w.o. Nordhaus, IIASA, Ref. [3]).
FORECASTING ENERGY DEMAND
Proceeding further, it is clear that the main aspect of the
energy problem is the matching of energy supply and energy
demand with the necessary assessment of all impacts, that is
with a clear understanding of the embedding of energy in the
various spheres:
the atmosphere, i.e. interaction of energy with the
climate;
the hydrosphere, i.e. interaction of energy with global
water resources;
the ecosphere, i.e. interaction of energy with the
environment; and
J
the sociosphere, i.e. interaction of energy with
society, the assessment of risks
and, still more important, the
perception of risks by individuals
or by groups*.
After having obtained some idea of the penetration lead-time
for new fuel technologies, the second most important aspect of
long-term energy strategy designing and forecasting is the
assessment of energy demand. And this is the nightmare of energy
planners ...
Roughly speaking, energy demand is the product of population
multiplied by average energy consumption per capita. Regardless
of how one handles it, this product seems to be governed by some
modified Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle .•. On a national basis f
maybe, the population level is better known than the future
average level of energy consumption. On a global basis, the
population level itself is largely unknown.
Figure 6 gives the latest estimates of the United Nations,
which level between approximately 12 and 13 billion people after
the year 2100. However, such figures are contested as being
pithpr rno low, as is done by some "Club of Rome" or "population
eXfJlosion" experts, or else as being too high by, for instance,
the French school of demographers. We know, in any case, that
we cannot do much about this. One point, however, is worth
stating: When study groups select values on the high side, it
does not at all mean that they are enthusiastic promoters of these
high values, but only that they prefer to err on the safe side
of forecasting.
The second factor is the level of energy consumption per
capita. Figure)' shows the actual distribution for some nations.
It is well known that there are dramatic differences between the
various countries. But what about the future? Alvin Weinberg [6],
one of the first, if not the first, to introduce such consider-
ations for long-term energy strategies, quoted a very generous
(but perhaps unrealistic ... ) average value of 20 kW thermal
equivalent per capita (approximately 26 t.c.e. per capita) ,
roughly twice the average American level of today. Presently,
many scenarios are written with lower asymptotic values of 10 kW
or simply 5 kW, which still represent an increase by factors of
3 to 6 compared to the present world average.
*Because of its acuity, we should like to quote the
following statement by NoL. Franklin of British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.:
"In view of the inportance of the issues involved, a careful study
of the reasons for the public hypersensitivity should rate high in national
energy prograrrrres. we should be foolish to continue the present policies of
invest:roont in super-safety, with coIlSa:Jl1el1t increases in energy costs, without
a substantial effort to understand the part played by rejection of all technology,
by specifically nuclear considerations and by media manipulation of news and
a::mment, up:m the public attitudes to nuclear facilities."
Such studies are the main aim of the joint IIASA/IAEA Project
on Risk Assessment [5].
j
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Figure 6. World population growth
(Source: UN World Population Conference, Bucharest,
August 1974-Report of the Secretary General).
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Figure 7. Distribution of world energy consumption, 1971
(178 countries) (Compiled from: UN World Energy
Supplies 1968-1971).
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If we look at the world as it is now and consider the next
50 or 100 years, the chances of a perfect ･ ｱ ｵ ｡ ｬ ｩ ｺ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ of revenues
and/or energy consumptions seem relatively small. Some nations
will develop or continue to develop, others may stabilize at best
or even fall. For the U.S., for instance, to reach a level of
20 kW/capita, a simple doubling of energy consumption is assumed
(but is it so simple?); this could be achieved with a constant
growth rate of about 1.4% per year for the next 50 years, or
ｾ ｢ ｯ ｵ ｴ ?7% fo: the next 100 years. However, for the less energy
lntenslve natlons to reach the same level, an almost 200-fold
increase or a constant growth of energy consumption per capita
of 10% to 12% per year for the same 50 years would be required.
To analyze such factors, we have explored various scenarios
of world popUlation growth and energy consumption per capita.
Two of them are summarized in Table 1 and compared to that of
A. Weinberg in 1971. Weinberg's world is highly egalitarian;
unfortunately ours is not. In the two cases displayed here, 33%
or 20% of the world population would consume 48% or 58% respectively
of the ｴ ｾ ｴ ｡ ｬ energy. In the lowest case, the world average energy
consumptlon per capita has roughly doubled, but the increase is
relatively small for 80% of the world population, which itself
has been multiplied by a factor of between 2.5 and 3. But one
of the most interesting results is the level of total energy used:
135 TW in the highest case, 38 TW in the lowest case; this is
6 times more than today (or 4%/year for 50 years), but 8 times
less than Weinberg's forecast. This shows the range within which
energy planners have·to build up their strategies.
In Weinberg's case, at equilibrium, total world coal resources
of about 8,700 billion metric tons of hard coal equivalent, as
reported in the Survey of Energy Resources for the last World
Energy Conference in Detroit in September 1974 [7], would last
about 20 years. In the lowest case, they would last 160 years.
The difference is not trivial, and we touch here upon another
factor, or let us say another difficulty, of energy forecasting,
namely the energy mix. It is almost a difference in the nature
of the problem whether to meet total energy requirements of 300 TW
with only one fuel, with coal, for example, or to cover perhaps
20% of energy requirements of 38 TW with the same coal; the ratio
jumps from 8 to 40, and the lifetime of the resources from about
20 years to 800 years, with an absolute level which will never-
theless be 3 times higher than present world production and
consumption.
In the Energy Program we are exploring some "high" one-fuel
scenarios because they are useful in providing us with limits, or
constraints, as already mentioned for the C02 problem related to
a large coal deployment. But of course, it is my conviction that
we are in fact heading toward an energy mix of a few major fuels
or resources, and that such an energy mix will probably differ
largely from country to country. If the total level of energy
supply depends on the final level of the energy demand, the
distribution of this energy supply among various resources
depends very much on the final uses of the energy demand and the
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preferred forms. By this we mean the secondary energies which
will be used in the future: electricity, synthetic natural
gas, methanol, hydrogen; etc.
Table 1. Global scenarios for energy consumption.
Cases Number In " of Energy Total In % of World
of total con- energy world average
people sump- used total per
x10 9 tion 10 9 capitaper ｫ ｾ Ｇ ｬ (th) kW(th)
capita
kW (th)
-
1.5 10 } 33 20 30 22} 48 9
Highest 3.5 23 10 35 26
10 67 7 70 52
-- --
15 135
0.5
1: }
20 10 26 } 58 3.820
1.5 8 12 32
Lowest 8.0 80 2 16 42
-- -
10 38
"Weinberg" 15 - 20 300 - 20
1971
THE TRANSITION AWAY FROM A PURE FOSSIL FUEL ECONOMY
Our development has been based on an extensive use of fossil
fuels. How long it can be continued in the same fashion has
periodically been queried for political, economic or technological
reasons. This question has been in the forefront since the oil
crisis of 1973/1974 for political reasons as well as because of
considerations about the final amount of fossil fuel resources,
and especially that of oil, which is the most extensively used.
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Due to the inertia in the energy sector, as illustrated
above, such a transition will be a major undertaking which can
proceed smoothly if properly planned and organized, or can be
a source of unexpected troubles if insufficiently prepared.
To explore this basic problem, a model has been developed
at IIASA by W. Hafele and A.S. Manne [8] (dealing mainly with
the transition from a fossil to an all-fissile economy, the
two secondary energies being electricity and hydrogen produced
by LWR, FBR and HTGR). This model was improved and extended by
A. Suzuki and L. Schrattenholzer to also include solar energy
[9J. A few characteristics of this linear programming model
are summarized below.
Constraints
1) Meet demand of each sector in each time period
2) Limited resource availability
a) Coal
b) Petroleum and gas
c) Low cost natural uranium ($15/lb)
3) Nuclear fuel balance equations
a) Plutonium
b) U-233
4) Limited annual construction capacity
for non-fossil technology
Figure 8 illustrates two possible types of growth for a "model
society" and Figures 9 and 10 show preliminary results.
We are now uSlng this model to explore other kinds of
scenarios, including another multi-fuel scenario with nuclear
and coal as major suppliers. Here coal is used as a raw material
for the production of synthetic natural gas in high temperature
gas-cooled reactors. Compared to hydrogen, this alternative
could be less demanding on the industrial components and equipment
for the utilization sector.
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LONG TERM ENERGY ALTERNATIVES
w. Hafele has summarized the five presently-known long-term
energy alternatives or options for "unlimited energy supply"
(Figure 11) with some assessment of their technological maturity
and of their possible side effects.
It is clear, as illustrated by Figure 12, that these various
alternatives have received quite different attention and support
in the last 20 years. Although this is progressively being
somewhat corrected, it is, in fact, very difficult to compare
these various alternatives. These difficulties of comparison
lie at two levels: First, the methodology for comparing
"apples and oranges" [10] is still in its infancy; second, the
knowledge of the technologies involved and the data available
differ widely from one energy resource area to the other.
Coal
Fission
(Breeder)
Solar
Fusion
(D - T)
Geothermal
Resources
200Q
6
::::::10·10 Q
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Technological
Maturity
Mature at present
scale
To be developed
for large scale
Sufficient for
power plants
Not yet suffi-
cient for large
scale fuel cycle
To be developed
for large scale
To be developed
To be developed
Side Effects
Unfavorable work-
ing conditions
Land requirements
CO 2 waste and other
pollutions
Storage of fis-
sion products
Emission of
radionuclides
Land requirements
Materials require-
ments
Climatic disturbance?
Storage and
transportation
Storage of
activated material
Emission of
radio nuclides
Storage of waste?
Emission of
pollutants?
Earthquakes?
Figure 11. Options for "unlimited" energy supply.
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Figure 12. U.S. energy R&D expenditures,
federal and private sectors, 1973 ($ million) .
Comparing "apples and oranges" is a difficult task. Figures
13a and 13b present three different methods which are being studied
at the Institute and which are partially used for comparing energy
alternatives: benefit-cost analysis, matrix methods (some examples
will be presented hereafter for the comparison of energy resources
and their harvesting) and preference theory.
Concerning technologies and data, question marks for geo-
thermal energy illustrate the nature of the problem. Although
the resource base of geothermal energy--e.g. the latent heat
stored in the top 10,000 meters of the earth's crust--is very
impressive, how much of this can really be recovered is a hard
question to answer.
When we restrict ourselves for the following to coal (or, on
a broader basis, to carbon fuels) fission fuel and solar, it becomes
interesting to compare these three resources. To do this, we
have developed a matrix method called WELMM:
-16-
Methodology Aggregation of Assumptions on Assessment
impacts into desirability
scaler index
Benefit-cost Almost Uses monetary Uses economic
analysis everything units; compares data
impacts in this
unit
Matrix methods Usually not Assumes non- No desirability
comparability assessment
Preference Everything Relationships Assessment
theories explicit and
rigo:r:ously
defined
Methodology Examples Experience
Benefit-cost Benefit-cost analysis Much in U.s.
analysis
Matrix methods Planning balance sheet Some -
Goals achievement matrix in vogue now
Environmental impact matrix
Factor profile
Preference Indifference surfaces Limited
theories Value functions
utility functions
Figures 13a and b. Methodologies for comparing energy
alternatives.
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WELMM
Water
ｾ ｮ ･ ｲ ｧ ｹ
Land
Materials
!:!anpower .
. The WELMM approach assesses the various impacts of energy
deployment on water resources; on land; on the energy balance
(or energy analysis, i.e. the energy expenditures which are
necessary to produce energy, leading to the ratio of net energy
to gross energy contents); on the materials balance; and on the
manpower requirements. As far as possible, we consider not only
direct requirements but also what we call indirect requirements
(for instance, the energy embedded in materials) and the "invest-
ment" or "capital" requirements (the energy embedded in infra-
structure and buildings, for example) .
Figure 14 shows a comparison of the energy content of some
fossil fuels with fissile fuels. The scale covered by fissile
fuels extends over 10 decades, from pure uranium for the
breeder (the mines of which are the tailings of enrichment
plants ... ) to uranium from sea water for the light water reactor.
It is interesting to observe that the Tennessee uranium shales
(at 60 ppm U content) compare with coal if used in light water
reactors (LWR's). Presently, uranium ores of Ｐ Ｎ Ｒ ｾ or 2,000 ppm
are mined and used in the world in LWR's. One of the biggest
problems with nuclear development (assuming that it will over-
come some of its present difficulties) is related to uranium
resources and their use: How large are the resources and how
long will they be used in converters? It is worth remembering
that, comparing uranium mining to copper mining, for instance,
the average grade of copper ore mined in the U.S. has decreased
by a factor of 7 (from 4% to 0.6%) in less than 70 years. If
a similar decrease, or possibly a more severe one, were to take
place for uranium, we believe that the mining problem would become
extremely acute. For the time being, the more necessary the
introduction of the breeder seems the more its future appears
to be clouded or uncertain.
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Figure 14. Gross energy content and mining scale.
Table 2.
Case
U30 8 requirements for different reactor mixes.
Cumulat.ive U30 8
consumption to
year 2020
(thousands of tons)
1. No breeder, HTGR constrained to
no more than 25% of total
nuclear capacity
2. No breeder, HTGR unconstrained
3. Delayed LMFBR introduction (1991)
4. LHFBR constrained to 200 GW(e) in
year 2000, introduced 1988
5. LMFBR constrained to 400 GW(e) in
year 2000, introduced 1987 (base
case)
'.
6. No constraints on LMFBR or H GR,
LMFBR introduced 1987
7. Total energy demand reduced by 50%
by year 2020; LMFBR introduced 1987
5,726
4,760
3,091
2,878
2,332
2,262
1 ,849
•
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It is interesting to compare uranium requirements to
uranium resources. Table 2 shows a recent assessment of
uranium requirements for the u.s. [11] based on various
assumptions, including reprocessing and recycling. There is
a factor of 3 between high and low values. Figures 15 and 16
show an estimation of U.S. uranium resources [12]. It is worth
mentioning that a much more detailed estimation has been
launched by the U.S.A.E.C. NURE program (Natural Uranium Reserach
and Exploration Program), with results expected for 1980.
It appears today that insufficient efforts have been
devoted to the two ends of the nuclear fuel cycle, reprocessing
(and the problem of radioactive waste disposal) and uranium
resources, compared to the amount of efforts made with regard to
the reactors themselves. In a sense, we can say that this state-
ment is also generally true for most of the energy resources,
and possibly also for many of our natural resources.
Looking at a general scheme of ｣ ｬ ｡ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｦ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｴ ｩ ｯ ｮ for energy (or
mineral) resources, for instance at the U.S. Geological Survey-
Bureau of Mines' diagram (often referred to as the McKelvey
diagram) (Figure 17), there are many categories of resources
ranging from the proven economically recoverable reserves to the
farthest subeconomic speculative resources in undiscovered
districts. For industrial purposes, the proven reserves are the
most important. They are the daily ingredient of business, and
they are generally secured on a 20 to 30 year, and at best 50
year, basis compared to the present level of consumption. For
U.S. coal, for example, proven reserves represent about 1.7%, or
50 billion metric tons, on an estimated total of about 3,000
billion tons.
But it is clear that, for long-term energy planning or
strategies, or for the purpose of choosing between two possible
alternatives such as coal or uranium, our knowledge of the energy
resources is far from adequate. For uranium, we do not have even
the slightest idea of possible figures for the total amount,
apart from reference Figure 16--which does not mean much--of the
abundance of uranium in the earth's crust. There is a good chance
that lithe uranium is there" [13]; hut where, in which form, in
which amounts? Recently doubts were expressed--for instance,
by the O.E.C.D./I.A.E.A. Working ｾ ｡ ｮ ･ ｬ on Vranium--that it can
be found in time to meet the future requirements, and figures
of 20 billion dollars have been mentioned just for exploration
in the coming decades [13].
•
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LARGE SCALE HARVESTING OF ENERGY RESOURCES
No less important than the problem of assessing energy
resources is the problem of harvesting them. We are devoting
a special effort to this topic, especially with the WELMM matrix
method, as already mentioned.
As pointed out by A. Weinberg, let us recall that about 80%
of the "demandite" (generic name for all the material which is
mined out of the ground, excluding water) consists of CHx, i.e.
of fossil fuel; of the remainder, 11% is Si02 and 4% is CaC03;
iron represents only 1.1% (but 86% of the "avalloy" which is
effectively used by man). Of the total value of metals and
non-metals, thus excluding fossil fuels, 5% only is produced
by underground mining methods, and 95% by open-pit mining,
dredging and solution evaporation.
One of the most striking phenomena of the last decades
has been this development of open-pit or surface mining for
energy resources also, as illustrated by coal and uranium today
and by future plans for oil shales and tar sands. For example,
in the U.S. in 1973, 70% of the uranium reserves were under-
ground and 19% were open-pit (the difference is accounted for
by various other sources); but only 36% of the production came
from underground, and 62% came from open-pit.
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It is probable that world-mining will continue its ､ ｶ ｮ ｾ ｭ ｩ ｣
growth, growing faster than true production because of the
harvesting of lower grades and deeper deposits--and possibly
also smaller ones. Only open-pit mining seems able to answer
this growing demand, while we are waiting for new underground
mining methods to be effectively developed. Such methods include
automatization (already very high in some coal mines), remote
control, tele-operation, solution mining or m situ processing
(for coal, oil shales, etc.). The potential of open-pit or
surface mining can be illustrated by the lignite exploitation in
the Rhine area F.R.G., on sites such as Garsdorf (300 m open pit, in
operation) and Harnbach (600 m open pit planned for 1980), and by
uranium mining in Wyoming, u.S.
Yet open-pit mining raises many problems, such as the
disturbance of underground water equilibrium, land requirements,
material handling, etc.
Land requirements have been estimated (Figure 18) and used
for a rough comparison of three energy alternatives: coal, solar
and nuclear (Table 3). A similar comparison has been made for
material requirements (Table 4). It is interesting to note that
land and material requirements are comparable for the three ｯ ｰ ｴ ｾ ｯ ｮ ｳ
if nuclear developments lean on the LWR and on uranium ores of
even lower grade, but are changed by one or two orders of
magnitude when based on the timely introduction of the breeder.
10km2
1km2
0.1km2 -
01 SEAM THICKNESS 10
Figure 18. Land disturbed for producing 10 6 t.c.e.
j
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Table 3. Land requirements for a 1,000 ｍ ｬ ｾ Ｈ ･ Ｉ power plant.
Fuel Attribute Specification Area Comment
km2
Coal Strip mine 2 m seam 25
(+high-volt- 10 m seam 5 Temporary
age line)
Solar 4 2 30 PermanentTower con- kWh/m /day
cept n = 0.2
Nuclear Site 0.08-0.05
LWR-U Shale 2 m seam 37 Temporary10 m seam 7.5
(high-volt- (20) (non-
age line) exclusive)
Table 4. Materials requirements for a 1,000 MW(e) power plant.
Fuel Weight of station Total flow Comments
(10 6 t) ( 10 6 t)
Coal 0.3 - 0.35 50 Coal (25 years)
0.5 0.6 LWR 2.5 - 75 U 0.2% - U shaleNuclear - (25 years)FBR 0.04 - 1.2
Solar 0.35 (conversion) 1 30 Mineral ores( tower) 0.3-3 (heliostat) - (- 5-7 years)
In fact, one does not always realize the possible dimension
of the material handling problem which can be associated with
nuclear development. Table 5 illustrates the waste problem
associated with using uranium ores of low content, and Table 6
shows what the resulting impact would be for two given scenarios.
-24-
Table 5. Wastes for uranium ores of low content
(in tons, for one ton of uranium).
Ore Overburden
5 x ore wt. 10 x ore wt.
U 0.2% 500 2,500 5,000
U shale
(60 ppm) 16,700 83,000 167,000
U granite
(4 ppm) 250,000 1,250,000 2,500,000
Table 6. "Spoilite" for nuclear scenarios
(10 9 t).
Nature of Ore Overburden
Resource 5 x ore wt. 10 x ore wt.
World
"Year 2000" U 0.2%, LWR 0.21 1. 05 2. 1
3,620,000 MW(e) U shale, LWR 7 35 70
World
10 U granite,10 people
15 kW(th)/cap breeder 30 150 300
OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS FOR ENERGY SCENARIOS
Because it was the simplest, and because there was a strong
tendency to stress purely economic factors, objective functions
have generally concentrated on discounted costs. At IIASA we
are also exploring possibilities to minimize pollution (i.e.
to internalize this factor in our model) and also to minimize
impact on natural resources in the broad sense, that is, to
include not only mineral resources but also water, land, etc.
Of course, the consideration I have developed to illustrate the
problem of harvesting energy resources--because I think that
insufficient attention has been paid to it--can and must be
extended to the whole energy cycle, from the resource in the
ground to the final energy use.
j
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In reality, the decision-making process is not limited to
the choice of the primary energy resource because there are
also various alternatives for the large scale development of
any advanced energy system, as shown in Figure 19 for nuclear
energy [9]. Bearing in mind the necessity to minimize discounted
cost--and as far as possible, capital requirements because of
growing competition for capital availability and conceivably
even risks of capital shortage--and also to minimize impacts on
the environment and natural resources, one important problem is
the consideration of secondary energies. With the increasing
cost of energy, some trade-off must be achieved between energy
(and natural resource) conservation and the simplicity of final
energy use. This points to the search for the most
efficient systems. I think that in this field yet too little
effort has been devoted to the possibilities of directly using
the heat produced by nuclear reactors*, and to the study of
secondary energy systems based on direct-heat transportation,
storage and use, as well as on chemical energy sytems [14]. In
this respect I consider that the development of high temperature
reactors has a very high potential. The coming years, even maybe
the coming months, will be crucial for them. Taking into account
the penetration lead-times mentioned at the beginning of this
paper, let us hope that we will not "foreclose the option".
ENER GY
PRODUCTIONS
SEC. ENERGY
SYSTEMS:
t-=-==t-- CENTRALIZED.
RESILIENT
Ｂ｟ｾ _ CENTRALIZED.
COUPLED
I---f- CENTRALIZED.
AUTONOMOUS
LOCAL.
AUTONOMOUS
MOS TLY ELECTRIC
ｾＮＺＮＮＮＮＮＮＮＺＮＮ］ＺＮＮＮ［］ＭＭ ....... NO
---
?
RELATED ?
r-------....;....'---.......;'-------....
TIME
Figure 19. A decision tree for advanced energy systems.
*notwithstanding the incentive to increase the efficiency
of electricity production.
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Finally, looking at the future availability of mineral
resources, H.E. Goeller and A. Weinberg [15] point out that
iron ore no doubt is one of the most abundant mineral resources.
If iron ore is associated with a low cost energy source they
foresee together that mankind can meet many of its materials'
needs with iron and energy. One scenario could associate steel
and· the very high temperature reactor, which are two typical
Japanese products.
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